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Introduction: Industrial Policy 
in the African Context 
Joseph Stiglitz, Justin Yifu Lin, Celestin Monga, Ebrahim Patel 
In his celebrated memoirs, Nelson Mandela recounts the story of having 
to battle his political adversaries and friends alike to convince them of 
the necessity of launching an armed movement in their fight against the 
unbearable brutalities of apartheid. Even his closest allies and supporters 
resented the idea of resorting to such a controversial strategy, one that raised 
deep moral questions and required complex implementation capabilities. 
They opposed his views until he was able to explain that the battle for 
freedom and prosperity is never an elegant linear path, and that sometimes 
one has to take unexpected detours and rely on trial-and-error tactics. He 
finally got his way. And yet the most difficult challenge occurred after his 
recommendations were eventually validated by his peers, who then asked 
him to actually implement them. Mandela had no choice but to accept 
that responsibility. He quickly realized how testing it can be to move from 
impeccable theoretical reasoning to concrete action on the ground. He 
writes: 1111 who had never been a soldier, who had never fought in battle, 
who had never fired a gun at an enemy, had been given the task of start-
ing an army. It would be a daunting task for a veteran general, much less a 
military novice. 111 
Many economists who have long argued in favor of industrial policy -
defined as a policy by which governments attempt to shape the sectoral 
allocation of the economy- now find themselves in a similar situation. After 
long suffering from benign neglect, if not outright contempt by some of their 
self-proclaimed 11mainstream 11 colleagues who long dismissed it disdainfully, 
they are now listened to. Industrial policy is almost fashionable again. The 
global financial and economic crisis known as the Great Recession has forced 
researchers and policymakers to confront the reality that market forces alone 
generally do not lead to (constrained) Pareto-efficient outcomes.2 Many 
important national and global policy objectives (equality of opportunity 
for all citizens, financial stability and inclusion, environmental protection 
and pollution control, and so on) are simply often not reflected in market 
prices and not achieved by markets on their own. In addition to traditional 
I 
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justification for industrial policies - dealing externalities and coordination 
issues - economists and policymakers now acknowledge the need to foster 
learning at the level of each economic agent and throughout society, and 
the ultimate responsibility that the state must bear in that crucial process. 
But converting the now widely accepted theoretical principles of indus-
trial policy into practical frameworks for concrete government action is 
indeed a daunting task everywhere, and perhaps more so in the African 
context where the institutional underpinnings of effective government are 
often not as strong as one might have hoped. Just like Mandela, who found 
himself in the unviable position of having his controversial ideas recognized 
and being designated to make them work, proponents of industrial policy 
now have the responsibility of fleshing out an implementation framework 
that deliver results for policymakers in developing countries. In undertak-
ing that overwhelming assignment, they could learn from Mandela's basic 
insights when he faced a comparable task: "l began in the only way 1 knew 
how, by reading and talking to experts, he writes. What 1 wanted to find out 
were the fundamental principles for starting a revolution. 1 discovered that 
there was a great deal of writing on this very subject, and I made my way 
through the available literature ... "3 
There is indeed a rich literature on industrial policy and several advanced 
and developing countries have successfully implemented industrial poli-
cies (though not always calling it by that name). Our understanding of 
industrial policy has been enriched through practice and constant learning. 
It is therefore almost a contribution to global public knowledge to review 
that literature. This book, the output from a conference held in Pretoria,' 
highlights its intellectual foundations and broad principles, outlines the 
contours of the policy agenda, reviews some interesting case studies of 
implementation
1 
fleshes out the lessons learned1 and identifies the issues for 
future research aims at doing just that. Its focus is on Africa, still the home 
to most of the "bottom billion" poor people in the world, but a continent 
on the move - the fastest-growing in the world.5 Underlying all the papers 
collected here is the recognition that there has been substantial progress on 
the understanding and acceptance of industrial policy, and that Africa could 
benefit enormously from it, and from the unprecedented new opportunities 
brought to light by a multipolar world. 
The acknowledgment of some self-evident truths 
"To truth only a brief celebration of victory is allowed between the two long 
periods during it is condemned as paradoxical, or disparaged as trivial." 
(Schopenhauer 1958 [1818], p. xxv) 
The idea of industrial policy has gone through these various stages. Once 
considered anathema among mainstream ,economics and in the public dis-
course, it has become a matter of almost common sense. Conservative and 
liberal leaders throughout the 
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liberal leaders throughout the world are now promoting it as a vehicle for 
creating high-skilled jobs, building more equitable societies, and protecting 
the environment1 and development institutions appear more inclined to 
acknowledge it as an essential tool to foster structural change in advanced 
and low-income nations. 
There is now widespread recognition among researchers and policymak-
ers of the many reasons countries should design and implement industrial 
policy: to correct market failures, situations where markets by themselves do 
not lead to efficient, or desirable1 resource allocations, and in some cases1 
even to correct other government failures1 where other, harder to alter1 gov-
ernment policies 11 distort 11 resource allocations. 
Such truths have been known and part of economic theory since at least 
Adam Smith, and the legitimacy of government inte1vention was well 
described by List et al. (1856). Following Marshall (1920), who pointed out 
the important role of externalities, and the work of Arrow and Debreu, which 
laid out the highly restrictive conditions under which markets resulted in 
(Pareto-)efficient outcomes, neoclassical theorists eventually acknowledged 
that markets often don't work as they are supposed to. But conservative 
economists continue to argue for a limited role for government intervention. 
First, they argued that these market failures were limited in scope. In the 
wake of the environmental destruction and the financial collapses associ-
ated with unfettered markets, such views have littie support today. 
But even when conservatives acknowledged that there are extensive mar-
ket failures, they had little confidence that government intervention would 
succeed in improving matters. They cited examples of government inter-
ventions to correct market failures that led to economic distortions. Against 
market failures they set what they argued were pervasive government fail-
ures, especially in developing countries. Some argued that these problems 
were especially severe in the area of industrial policies. Confronted with 
the implementation challenges associated with the task, many economists 
chose to dismiss entirely the notion of industrial policy. 
Surprisingly, such bold claims were supported neither by theoretical or 
ernpitical/historical analyses. The latter made clear that there were many 
instances of successful government intervention. Around the world1 there is 
, _a broad consensus that effotts to control environmental externalities have1 
·by and large, worked, and have improved our wellbeing - by an amount that 
fur exceeds any costs that may have been imposed. Cities where the air was 
unbreathable have become livable again; water that was badly polluted has 
become drinkable and swimmable. 
Even in the area of industrial policy there have been notable successes . 
. 'Indeed, the United States, for more than a hundred and fifty years, has 
"!benefited from such policies, from the development of the agricultural sec-
. tor (the dominant sector in the economy in the mid-19th century), to the 
development of telecommunications (from the development of the first 
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telegraph line in the first half of the 19th century to the development of the 
internet - one of the central areas of growth in the 21st century). 
Arguably, the East Asia Miracle - the most remarkable episodes of growth 
in history-was based largely on government interventions into the market 
economyi including extensive use of industrial policies.6 
These examples should make it clear that the "political economy" problems 
posed by critics of government intervention are neither inevitable nor univer-
sal. (These conservative critics of industrial policy provide no general theory 
that the political economy problems are severe, inevitable, and universal.) 
This has led to a marked shift in the policy debate, to what are the circum-
stances under which industrial policies will work, and what forms of indus-
trial policy are appropriate for countries in different stages of development 
and with different poiJitical and economic institutions. 
For instance
1 
some have made a distinction between economy-wide (''hor-
izontal") policies, defined as consisting of general business environment 
policies that have only an indirect impact on any given sector or industry, 
and sector- or industry-specific types of industrial policy (often labeled as 
11vertical11). 
Thus, in the 1990s, it became the conventional wisdom that the former 
should be the foundation for policymaking - as they ensure a level playing 
field for market forces to determine successful industries - and the latter 
opposed - because governments could not be trusted to 11pick winners.
11 
Even then, though, many, even in the international economic institutionsi 
questioned this wisdom, questioning, for instance, the intellectual founda-
tion for such a fiawed distinction (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001 ). 
But it took the 2008 Great Recession to bring about a wider understanding 
of the deficiencies in the conventional wisdom and in the standard models 
upon which they rested. Those models failed, by all the most important 
tests of scientific theory. They did not predict that the financial crisis would 
happen; and when it did, they understated its effects. Monetary authori-
ties allowed bubbles to grow and focused on keeping inflation low, partly 
because the standard models suggested that low inflation was necessary and 
almost sufficient for efficiency, growth and prosperity (Stiglitz, 2011). After 
the crisis broke, policymakers relying on the models floundered. 
In the wake of the crisis, , macroeconomists from various ideological back-
grounds are now re-exrunining some of the discipline1s dogmas, questioning 
what was thought to be infallible certainties, and stressing the importance 
of new knowledge. Summing up the intellectual changes that are needed, · 
Olivier Blanchard, the IMF Chief Economist, writes: 
We've entered a brave new world1 a very different world in terms of mac-
roeconomic policymaking. In the age-old discussion of the relative roles 
of markets and the state, the pendulum has swung - at least a bit - toward 
the state. There are many distortions relevant for macroeconomics, many 
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more than we thought was the case earlier. We had largely ignored them, 
thinking they were the province of the microeconomist. As we integrate 
finance into macroeconomics, we1re'discovering that distortions within 
finance are macro-relevant. Agency theory- about incentives and behav-
iour of entities or 11 agents11 - is needed to explain how financial institu-
tions work or do not work and how decisions are taken. Regulation and 
agency theory applied to regulators themselves is important. Behavioural 
economics and its cousin, behavioural finance, are central as well. 11 
(Blanchard, 2011) 
Such candor and humility from a place known for its staunch defense of 
orthodoxy can only be welcome. 
The crisis has made clear that these market failures are of first-order 
importance - they affected the overall performaoce of the economy. 
)v!acroeconomists have focused on how they affect economic volatility, and 
'.what public policies might stabililze the economy. Here we focus on indus-
lrial policies, policies directed at affecting the shape of the economy (includ-
\Dg the sectoral allocation of resources and the choices of technology within 
' y given sector). While discussions have traditionally focused on how such 
ides can affect the long-run rate of growth, the papers in this volume 
6 discuss other social objectives to which such policies may be directed: 
roving the distribution of income, increasing employment, protecting 
-environment, ensuring sustainability. 
e global finaocial aod economic crisis has also brought to light the 
that market forces do not exist in a vacuum, and that they are all 
ped by laws, rules, and regulations, each of which is never truly "neu-
£11 as it explicitly or implicitly favors or discourages particular indus-
. , sectors, firms, and social players. All governments really do have ao 
trial policy. The only difference is between those who construct their 
trial policy consciously, aod those who let it be shaped by others, 
lly by special interests, who vie with each other for hidden and 
subsidies, for rules and regulations that favor them, usually at the 
se of others. 
ent years, there has been an increasing understanding of the long 
'
1market 11 failures which government intetvention should and could 
. Many of the papers in this volume shed further light on them. For 
, it is now widely accepted that the government should try to do 
g about negative externalities (from pollution or from excessive 
ng in the financial sector). It has also become increasingly clear that 
ent interventions are needed to ensure proper coordination of risky 
mt decisions that no single firm or private agent alone can pursue 
y. So too, the government has played a constructive role in promot-
stries and activities which give rise to positive externalities - most 
hose associated with learning and research. 
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Thus, there is now an acceptance that governments should not limit 
themselves to engaging in just "horizontal" interventions. Those who reject 
industry-specific interventions must also confront the law of scarcity, espe-
cially in the context of developing countries. Identification of new indus-
tries and prioritization of government's limited resources (and more broadly, 
society's limited resources) to facilitate the development of those industries 
are both essential for successful growth strategies in Africa. Why? Because 
the infrastructure improvements required are often industry-specific. And 
markets cannot be relied upon to provide this infrastructure. 
One simply has to look at the list of recent success stories in African 
countries to understand the role that industrial policies have already been 
playing: textiles in Mauritius, apparel in Lesotho, cotton in Burkina Faso, 
cut fiowers in Ethiopia, mango in Mali, and gorilla tourism in Rwanda all 
required that governments provide different types of infrastructure. The 
refrigeration facilities needed at the airport and regular flights to ship 
Ethiopia's cut flowers to the auctions in Europe are obviously quite differ-
ent from the improvements required at the port facilities for textile exports 
in Mauritius. Similarly, the type of infrastructure needed for the garment 
industry in Lesotho is distinct from the one needed for mango production 
and export in Mali or for attracting gorilla tourism in Rwanda. Because fiscal 
resources and implementation capacity are limited, tbe government in each 
of those countries had to prioritize and decide which particular infrastruc-
ture they should improve or where to optimally locate the public services to 
make those success stories happen. 
Deng Xiaoping explained that pragmatic wisdom at the beginning of 
China's transition to a market economy when he advocated allowing a few 
regions and people to get rich first in order to achieve common prosper-
ity for all people in the nation. The dynamic growth in those regions and 
industries would increase fiscal revenues, giving the government more 
resources to improve infrastructure (or education or technology) for other 
regions in the nation later. 
Identification of new sectors or lines of business and the prioritization 
of infrastructure investment are also necessary because economies of scale 
may enhance the ability of a country (and the firms within the country) to 
be competitive in the globalized world. Without government coordination, 
firms may enter into too many different industries (all of which may be con-
sistent with the country's long term or dynamic comparative advantage). As 
a result, most industries may not form clusters that are sufficiently large and 
will not be competitive in the domestic and international markets. A few 
clusters may emerge eventually after many failures. Such a "trial and error 11 
process is likely to be long and costly, slowing down the country's economic 
development. lt is therefore imperative for a 11 facilitating11 state (or what 
is sometimes called a "developmental State117) in a developing country to 
identify and select new industries that are consistent with comparative 
vantage, use its limited resc 
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advantage/ use its limited resources to improve infrastructure for a limited 
number of carefully selected industries, provide adequate incentives for first 
movers1 and coordinate private firms' related investments in those indus-
tries so that clusters can be formed successfully and quickly.' 
The extent to which governments perform the roles just described - how 
well they perform these roles - may be among the most important determi-
nants of long-term economic success. 
There is also wide acceptance of a new rationale for industrial policy. 
Economic development is the process of technological diffusion and indus-
trial upgrading. It involves making knowledge available to the largest number 
possible of economic agents and fostering constant learning. Yet knowledge 
is different from conventional goods. It is, in a sense a public good (that is, the 
maiginal cost for another person or firm enjoying the benefits of knowledge -
beyond the cost of transmission - is zero). Moreover, usage is non-rivalrous. 
Markets (anywhere, whether in developed or developing countries) are not 
effident in the production and distribution of public goods. 
If economic development is essentially about the diffusion of knowledge 
among the broadest segments of society, then it is inevitable that there be, or 
there ought to be, a role for government intervention. It follows that industrial 
cJ:IOUcy should also be about facilitating the generation and acquisition of 
'new knowledge that empowers households and firms. in fact, formerly poor 
¢ountries - those in East Asia - that have been able to converge toward the 
income levels of advanced economies have generally done so through learning. 
,J:he mantra that governments should not be involved in "picking winners" is 
(h:erefore beside the point: the objective of any government should be not only 
Ji! correct negative externalities but also to promote positive externalities that 
',~se from learning and sharing knowledge. 
can opportunities and challenges9 
ay, Africa is a continent facing unprecedented opportunities for and 
Ienges to economic growth and development. The widely shared opti-
was expressed by the Economist magazine: 
ever in the half-century since it won independence from the colonial 
owers has Africa been in such good shape. Its economy is fiourishing. 
-Most countries are at peace. Ever fewer children bear arms and record 
numbers go to school. Mobile phones are as ubiquitous as they are in 
)!;J.dia and, in the worst-affected countries, HIV infections have fallen 
up to three-quarters. Life expectancy rose by a tenth in the past 
ade and foreign direct investment has tripled. Consumer spending 
l almost double in the next ten years; the number of countries with 
age incomes above $1,000 per person a year will grow from less than 
all of Africa's SS states to three-quarters. (Economist, 2013) 
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But each statistic showing unprecedented success and new opportunities is 
matched by some highlighting the future difficulties the region faces. 
Sub-Saharan Ahica has averaged 5 percent growth or more over the past 
decade. There are also countries that have an average growth rate of over 
7 percent. Many of the countries have demonstrated high levels of compe-
tency in macro-mangement, and even resolve in fighting corruption. 
However, the average gross national income (GNi) per capita of about 
$1,200 in 2012 was less than Bolivia's ($1,810).10 Moreover, the region's 
11 most successful11 economies are actually much poorer than the poorest 
countries in other regions of the world: Mozambique and Tanzania, which 
have been among the top-ten fastest-growing countries in the world over 
the past two decades, still have GNl per capita in the range of $400-500. 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, two countries often hailed as 11 turnaround suc-
cesses," still rank very low at $160 and $340, respectively. The Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Africa's third largest country, comparable in size to 
Western Europe, and a place where wars have claimed roughly four million 
vlctims in the last five years alone (according to the United Nations), had a 
GNi of less than $200 - similar to Burundi's. 
A static analysis using simply the mathematical rule of 72 indicates that 
at its current growth rate of 5 percent a year, it would take about a quarter-
century for Sub-Saharan Africa to double its income per capita - and reach 
today's still low GNl per capita of Paraguay ($2,250). Even if one assumes 
a very optimistic elasticity of poverty with respect to income of 1.5, Sub-
Saharan Africa's current rate of growth would translate into a reduction of 
only 3.3 percent per year of the region's high extreme poverty headcount 
index (1. 7 points each year from the current 50 percent).11 Other developing 
regions of the world have been able to do much better in recent decades. 
Widespread poverty is not the only worry: there are concerns about the 
sustainability of economic growth, unemployment, and inequality. About 
a third of the continent's good growth performance is attributable to com-
modities, and many African countries are still discovering new oilfields and 
mineral deposits. But history shows that excessive reliance on raw natural 
resources is never a prudent development strategy. While today's prices are 
near record highs, commodity markets are known to often coilapse abruptly. 
in addition, recent gains in agriculture may be undermined by climate change 
and envlronmental concerns. Already, savannahs are drying out, water tables 
are dropping, and rains either failing or becoming more inegular. 
The dynamics of demographic growth makes things even more clialleng-
ing: with average annual population growth projected to be 2.2 percent over 
the next 25 years, the African private sector faces the challenge of creating 
employment opportunities to absorb the youth bulge: about two-thirds 
of the Region's population is under the age of 24 and is underemployed -
including those with coliege and .university degrees. Most workers are 
trapped in very low-productivity activities in subsistence agriculture and the 
informal sector. Sub-Sah: 
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informal sector. Sub-Saharan Africa will have to generate between seven and 
ten million jobs annually in order to accommodate the high rate of popula-
tion growth (World Bank 2013). 
For a region facing such opportunities and challenges, industrial policy is 
not a speculative intellectual exercise for academic debates but rather a nec-
essary economic tool to address the pervasive discrepancies between private 
gains and social returns, and to correct major sectoral or other misalloca-
tions. ln the particular context of Africa, among the priorities are: (a) ensur-
ing that resources (labor, capital, knowledge) are transferred from low- to 
high-productivity sectors and areas. This includes the migration of Africa's 
abundant unskilled rural labor to unskilled labor-intensive industries; and 
(b) increasing productivity, through learning and education. 
Neither of these will occur on their own. Proactive action must be 
taken by policymakers. It is necessary, for instance, for the government 
to facilitate the growth of existing and emerging unskilled labor-intensive 
industries. Without such action, there is a risk that urban unemployment 
will increase even beyond the current high levels. On the supply side of 
the labor market, African governments must also provide basic education 
and training, to enhance the rural out-migrants' ability to adapt to the new 
working environment and requirements in the industrial sector. 
African political leaders generally understand these responsibilities and 
should be - and often are - using all the tools at their disposal to meet their 
goals. ln earlier periods, some in the international community discouraged 
them from using one important set of tools - industrial policies. This book 
is intended to "correct" this misguided advice - advice which arguably con-
tributed to the deindustrialization of Sub-Saharan Africa (to the point where 
today, the industrial sector has a smaller share of GDP than in 197012). (This 
deindustrialization is one of the factors that may have contributed to the 
decline in GDP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1976 and 1994.13) 
The question today is not whether African governments - like all govern-
ments in the world - should be engaged in industrial policy but whether they 
are doing it well, and how can they can do it better. The chapters in this 
book provide numerous insights that may help them to do so. 
Realities and myths about Africa's capabilities 
There has been persistent skepticism about the applicabllity of industrial 
policy to the particular context of Africa. Various factors - pathological poli-
tics, and pervasive corruption- are said to make industrial policy ineffective, 
or even counterproductive for the African countries. Skeptics also provide 
an impressive list of knowledge requirements about targeted industries that 
government officials would need to know in order to design a successful 
industrial policy. They question the capacity of governments in poor coun-
tries to meet those requirements. 
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Some of these arguments are deserving of serious attention. First, all coun-
tries at low-income level tend to lack high bureaucratic capacity by defini-
tion. But market failures also tend to be more pe1vasive, and there is often a 
shortage of private sector entrepreneurship. Hence, in many cases, state-led 
development (often employing marked mechanisms) has been shown to be 
the most effective development strategy. The point, as we have previ6usly 
noted, is that these concerns should affect the form of industrial policy, not 
whether the government should undertake industrial policy. 
On the other hand, the argument that the knowledge requirements for 
the effective design of industrial policies are beyond the capacities of devel-
oping countries is not very persuasive. Some of the so-called knowledge 
requirements identified for industrial policy are likely to be more relevant 
for more advanced industries in high-income countries. For industries with 
low technical content, the knowledge requirements are markedly more lim-
ited. Moreover, instead of analyzing the technical nature of various indus-
tries, government officials can rely on the advantage of backwardness and 
observe what the dynamically growing countries with similar endowment 
structures are already doing or have done in the past. 
By the same token, broad-based measures, for example, encouraging 
the industrial sector broadly, do not necessitate the government making 
fine-tuned judgments. As Greenwald and Stiglitz argue, such policies are 
desirable so long as learning elasticities and knowledge spillovers are greater 
in those sectors. Industrial policies can "tilt" the playing field toward sectors 
or technologies with positive spillovers/externalities and away from those 
with negative spillovers/externalities. 
Central to creating a modern economy is creating a learning economy and 
society, and government intervention can play an important role in doing this. 
The difficulties of implementing any type of public policy anywhere in the 
world are well known. Critics point to the scope for rent seeking. Avoiding 
rent seeking is but one of the challenges facing the effective implementa-
tion of industrial policy. In some cases, governments have been tempted to 
ignore economic "rationality" and pursued more sophisticated sectors in 
their zeal to emulate advanced countries; sometimes they have extended 
even successful policies well beyond their effective timespan. 
These concerns are legitimate but apply not only to whatever is labeled 
"industrial policy." The potential for abuse exists for any public policy: 
many governments around the world have misused monetary and financial 
regulatory policy, infrastructure policy, or education policy. But few would 
argue that, as a result, governments should eschew the use of monetary and 
financial regulatory policy, infrastructure policy, or education policy. The con-
trast between attitudes toward monetary and industrial policies is especially 
striking: While the fact that so many governments (including that of the USA) 
has mismanaged monetary policy is generally not viewed as grounds for aban-
doning monetary policy, the fact that industrial policies have sometimes been 
mismanaged has often been 
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anaged has often been used as an argument against such policies. And 
e is ample evidence of "capture" of the US Federal Reserve by the financial 
ket in the years before the crisis (arid, some critics say, even afterward). 
ver1 what some thought were mistaken industrial policies - such as 
.undertaken by Korea in the late 1960s and 1970s- proved enormously 
~essful, propelling that country forward, to enable it to join the OECD, the 
b of the advanced industrial countries. 
_ervasive governance issues are often offered as reasons not to engage in 
\!Stria! policy. But the countries that successfully engaged in industrial 
licies in recent decades had, at the time they embarked on their develop-
nt strategies, typically had far from perfect govemance structures (and 
e crisis illustrated, even the advanced countries have governance struc-
, r.es that are far from ideal) . 
•i;•'f<While political economy problems need to be taken seriously, one should 
;:;nQt let the best be the enemy of the good. To wait for the perfect African 
'&tale to emerge before industrial policy can be implemented would imply 
riever getting anything done. In the real world, successful countries are the 
ones that have managed to find "good enough" solutions to their political 
'economy problems and implemented these sound policies. Deficiencies in 
.·governance should affect the type of industrial policies and the manner in 
Which they are implemented, not the use of industrial policies themselves. 
Moreover, the decades of success and failures in industrial policies have 
· provided multiple lessons on how to design effect industrial policies. For 
instance Lin and Monga (2013) argue forcefully that the traditional type of 
industrial development strategies pursued by developing countries in the 
1950s and 1960s often encouraged firms to enter industries that were incon-
sistent with their comparative advantage (even broadly defined to include 
11dynamic11 comparative advantage). Firms in these industries were not viable 
in an open, competitive market. Their survival depended on heavy govern-
ment protection, large subsidies, and direct resource allocations through 
measures such as monopoly rent, high tariffs, quota restrictions, and sub-
sldized credits. The large rents embedded in those measures created many 
distortions and easily became the targets of political capture (Lin, 2012). 
The success of East Asian economies in designing and implementing smart 
government inteiventions proves that it is possible to promote the develop-
ment of industries that aTe consistent with the economy's latent comparative 
adVcllltage. Firms are viable once the constraints to their entry and operation are 
removed. The incentives provided by the goven1ffiffit to the first movers are to 
be ten1porary and small, solely for the purpose of compffisating for their infor-
mation externality. In that context, they have shown that the issues of pervasive 
rent-seeking and the pei·sistence of governmffit inteivention beyond its initial 
timetable can be mitigated; indeed, their experiffices provides insights into 
how this can be done. The likelihood of governance problems adsing is much 
reduced when the government facilitates the development of new industdes 
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that are consistent with the country's changing comparative advantage deter-
mined by the change in its endowment structure (Lin and Monga 2012). 
Other skeptical arguments against industrial policy in Africa are flawed . 
and reminiscent of those made throughout history to dismiss industrializa-
tion attempts in other regions of the world.14 Today1s ustructural 11 theories 
of "Afro-pessimism" are usually ex post justifications of the status quo, 
confusing the causes and the symptoms of underdevelopment. The notion 
of a capacity deficit in countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, or 
Cameroon is simply a myth. ln fact, it could be argued that these countries 
now have more capacity and potential access to financial resources from for-
eign savings with which to implement such policies than China had when it 
started its structural transformation process in the late 1970s. And in a world 
where labor has become a very mobile factor of production1 even countries 
with much weaker human capital stocks and administrative capacity could 
easily attract foreign expertise to help design and implement these policies. 
While the challenges of implementing industrial policy in any country 
need to be taken seriously, not only is this is a moment in which such poli-
cies are especially needed, this is a moment of real opportunity. They are 
needed in part because Africa is going through a major structural transfor-
mation, and markets by themselves manage such transformations poorly, 
for a variety of reasons that have been set forth elsewhere.15 But there is1 
in addition, a major structural transformation going on globally: rising real 
wages and current appreciation in China will result in at least significant 
parts of its manufacturing base moving elsewhere. There is an opportunity 
for some of it, perhaps a substantial part, to move to Africa. lf that were to 
happen, it would provide a significant boost to growth and employment. 
It would reverse the pattern of deindustrialization that began with the 
structural adjustment programs foisted on Africa in early decades. It would 
enhance the chances of creating the kind of learning society and economy 
that is often associated with the transition away from agriculture to manu-
facturing. But if this is to happen, active government policies wlll aimost 
surely be needed. Many African countries have gotten the fundamentals 
right - they have achieved macro-stability and reduced corruption. But the 
inflow of foreign direct investment1 apart from the natural resource sector, 
has been disappointing. There is at least some hope that, when combined 
with these other policies, there will be the kind of acceleration of growth 
that will be necessary if the region is to make the inroads into poverty for 
which it has so long strived. 
Contents of this volume 
The papers presented in this volume cover theoretical and policy issues of 
industrial policy, with a particular focus on the challenges and possibilities 
in the African context. 
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· The book begins with a discussion of broad conceptual issues of 
industrial policy, and the respective roles of the state and the market in 
., fostering inclusive economic growth and building equitable societies. Each 
subsequent section then takes up a particular aspect of Afiica's industriali-
zation challenge and debates what the scope should be and which policy 
;:;ihstrument may be used to achieve sustained and inclusive growth. As we 
· .'(lated earlier, virtually every aspect of economic policy affects the structure 
,'M an economy - and can be viewed through the lens of industrial policy. 
••Thus, we look not only at tradition "industrial policy" topics (trade, how 
do build industrial policies based on natural resource endowments), but 
-, __ :::Jion-traditional ones, such as macroeconomics and industrial structure, 
-'.}~x;change rate policies, competition, entrepreneurship, financial markets, 
ild outsourcing, and governance. Our discussions were grounded on coun-
. experiences, discussed extensively in several of the chapters. 
e first section deals with new theoretical thinkihg on industrial policy 
d lts transformational potential for Africa. In "Learning and Industrial 
icy: Implications for Africa," Greenwald and Stiglitz open the section by 
g that pervasive market failures (and other distortions which result 
· Pfivate rewards being misaligned with social returns) provide a rationale 
1 industrial policies. The chapter focuses on one particular set of market 
lures, those that arise in the process of learning: Learning is especially 
'portant for developing countries as they strive to close the gap between 
eir ihcomes and those of the more developed countries. Disparities in 
omes are as much related to gaps in knowledge as they are to gaps in 
rces. They argue that accordingly, a central focus of development policy 
;0,0ld be1 how to promote learning, how to create a "learning economy and 
c\ety." Greenwald and Stiglitz note that much of the advice of the past, 
d on neoclassical models, not only gave short shrift to these concerns, 
may actually have led to counterproductive policy prescriptions that 
e---adverse to learning, and hence to long term increases in standards of 
g. For Africa, as it attempts to reindustrialize, to restructure its econo-
~·to become more integrated into the global economy and move away 
'excessive dependence on commodity exports, to raise standards of 
e, increase employment, reduce poverty and inequality, and protect a 
eenvironment, industrial policies are of especial importance. 
, ill "From Flying Geese to Leading Dragons: New Opportunities 
•Strategies for Structural Transformation in Developing Countries," 
that economic development is a process of continuous industrial 
echnological upgrading in which any country, regardless of its level 
velopment, can succeed if it develops industries that are consistent 
lts comparative advantage, determined by its endowment structure. 
ccessful strategy for developing countries is to exploit the latecomer 
tage by building up industries that are growing dynamically in more 
ced, fast-growing countries that have endowment structures sihlilar 
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to theirs. By following carefully selected lead countries, latecomers can 
emulate the leader-follower, "flying-geese" pattern that has served catching-
up economies well since the 18th century. Lin suggests that the successful 
large middle-income countries such as China, India, and Brazil will be new 
growth poles in the world; and their dynamic growth, their clhnbing of 
the industrial ladder, offer an unprecedented opportunity to all developing 
economies with income levels currently below theirs - including those in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The second section surveys lessons in structural transformation from 
economic history. In "Accumulation of Capabilities, Structural Change 
and Macro Prices: an Evolutionary and Structuralist Roadmap,'' Cimoli and 
Porcile present a brief theoretical background on learning, capabilities, and 
innovation, with the aim of building bridges between evolutionary micro-
economics and the stmcturalist theories of economic development. They 
discuss the role that industrial policies play in reducing the technology gap 
and transforming the production stmcture within a developing context, 
giving special attention to the case of external shocks that affect the con-
solidation of technological capabilities. Chang, in "Industrial Policy: Can 
Africa Do It?,'' challenges the persistent skepticism about the applicability 
of industrial policy to Africa. He assesses the thesis that conditions in the 
region are so special that the continent can never use industrial policy pro-
ductively. He critically reviews old arguments of "Ah·o-pessimism" on the 
bases of climate, geography, history, and culture, as well as new arguments 
on natural resource abundance1 political economy, bureaucratic capabilities1 
and the changes in global economic rules. He suggests how constraints to 
the effective implementation industrial policy may be overcome through an 
appropriate mix of realism, reform1 and investments. 
The third section examines the new global order and its opportunities for 
African reindustrialization. Monga, in "Winning the Jackpot: Jobs Dividends 
in a Multipolar World,'' surveys some of the main strands of the theoretical 
literature on unemployment and employment, and stresses the fact that 
findings based on the experience of richer countries may not be transferable 
to low-income countries whose endowment and production structures are 
profoundly different from that of high-income economies. He then sheds 
light on the new economic opportunities that African countries may derive 
from the dynamics of globalization - especially the economic success of 
large emerging economies such as China and Brazil - and offers a simple 
analytical framework for identifying opportunities for labor arbitrage in 
global economy, with a practical policy framework for exploiting them. 
In the next chapter, "Walking (Stumbling?) on Two Legs: Meeting 
Sub-Saharan Africa's Industrialization Challenge,'' Kaplinsky argues that 
Industrial development is currently fremed by three major dynamics: 
the increase in the number of people living in absolute poverty despite 
high rates of growth; the emergence of China, India, and other southern 
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economies as sources of efficient appropriate technologies; and the com-
modity price boom, which may not last. He suggests that these dynamics 
present both threat and opportunity to future industrial development, and 
justify government policy intervention .. 
Having laid down the rationale for industrial policy in Africa, the poten-
tial new benefits of globalization, and the potential role of industrial poli-
cies in helping African countries take advantage of these new opportunities, 
tile book offers an operational agenda for the implementation of industrial 
policies. The fourth section is devoted to 11 enabling environment11 for the 
vision to materialize1 focusing on the macroeconomic and governance 
requirements. In "How Macroeconomic Policy Can Support Economic 
Development in Sub-Saharan African Countries," Heinz starts with the 
observation that because of institutional1 ideological1 and structural con-
straints, the scope for conducting macroeconomic policy to support indus-
trial development in Africa has traditionally been rather limited. He 
recommends broadening macroeconomic policy to enable it to better serve 
as an 11 instrument11 of industrial policy. To illustrate how this can be done1 
he focuses on management of the real exchange rate, monetary policy, and 
the mobilization of domestic fiscal resources. 
Creating a good environment for industrial development also requires 
putting in place a level playing field that encourages growth, risk taking, 
and innovation, and that provides scope for new entry. In "Competition 
Policy, Industrial Policy and Corporate Conduct," Roberts examines the role 
of competition law in industrial development and the relationship between 
tile work of competition authorities and industrial policy in South Africa. 
He notes that the South African competition authorities have been success-
ful in uncovering cartel conduct and blocking anti-competitive mergers, but 
tiley have had little success in addressing the power of entrenched domi-
nant firms whose decisions largely determine the development path of the 
economy. He suggests that altering the trajectory of industrial development 
will require a competition regime that reinforces industrial policy and curbs 
the power of dominant firms so that they can compete on the sole basis of 
dynamic capabilities. 
The next paper, "Political Settlements and the Design of Technology 
Policy" by Khan, sets the governance conditions for effective industrial 
policy. Khan observes that policies designed to address specific problems of 
technology adoption also create rents that the beneficiaries of these policies 
can try to capture without necessarily delivering results. If the organizations 
benefiting from rents are powerful and can use rent-seeking strategies to 
block the implementation of necessary conditions for success, technology 
policies can have poor results. Defining the distribution of power across eco-
nomic, political and bureaucratic organizations in a society as the prevailing 
11political settlement/1 Khan notes that the successful hnplementation of 
ambitious technology policies in East Asian developmental states happened 
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in political settlements that enabled the imposition of difficult conditions 
on powerful organizations. While political settlements in most developing 
countries preclude m~ny of these types of technology policy, there are usu· 
ally several possible policy responses to any particular technology acquisi· 
lion problem, with different conditions required for successful outcomes. 
Indeed, technology policies have worked in countries which did not have 
developmental states of the East Asian type when the required enforcement 
conditions were credible in their political settlements. 
This raises the burning question: can the "development state11 work for 
Africa1s industrialization? Noman1 in "Infant Capitalists, Infant Industries 
and infant Economies Trade and industrial Policies for Early Stages of 
Development in Africa and Elsewhere," points to the neglect of the institu· 
tion of 11 capitalists/entrepreneurs 1' - of particular salience for countries at , 
early stages of development. He suggests that there is an "infant capitalist" 
argument for protection1 and lessons from successes and failures in trade 
and industrialization policies, including in institution building1 can be used 
to establish well-designed systems of protection that help to divert rents to 
productive activities and learning. 
Taking stock of intellectual progress and integrating some of the view-
points expressed in this book, Joseph's chapter, "industrial Policies and 
Contemporary Africa: Frontiers of Political Economy and Social Science," 
concludes this section, by providing a framework for multidisciplinary work 
on governance. He recommends that arguments, hypotheses, and mod-
els advanced by economists be more closely juxtaposed with the work of 
researchers in other social science disciplines. 
Complementing the discussion of horizontal, cross-cutting problems of 
macroeconomics and governance, the fifth section tackles trade1 finance, 
and sectoral issues. ln "Does Financial Market Liberalization Promote 
Financial Development?," Rashid investigates whether the liberalization of 
financial markets did indeed promote financial development. His empirical 
analysis covers 13 Sub-Saharan economies and shows that financial market 
liberalization did not lead to financial development in these economies. He 
finds strong negative correlation between the level of financial market liber-
alization and domestic savings rate and credit to private sector and a strong 
positive correlation between financial liberalization with real interest rate 
and interest rate sprea'd in these countries. While his results are robust across 
different model specifications and estimation methods, he also points to 
the need for further research to determine how various aspects of financial 
market liberalization - the abolition of credit targets and credit controls, the 
deregulation of interest rates, the removal of entry barriers, the privatization 
of the banking sector, and so on - affect various dimensions of financial 
development. 
Chandrasekhar1s chapter, 11 Financialization as an Obstacle to Indus· 
trialization," complements and reinforces Rashid's analysis. He notes that 
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there is no monotonic, positive relationship between financial develop-
ment and growth. Indeed, in certain circumstances, through a number of 
routes, excessive financialization constrains industrial growth. Moreover, 
it is not just the size of finance that matters, but also the structure of the 
financial system. Experience shows that late-industrializing countries need 
to shape the markets
1 
institutions1 and instruments that constitute their 
financial structures and regulate the financial system so to use finance as 
an instrument for industrial development. However, financial liberalization 
undermines such specially constructed systems and constrains industrial 
development, besides increasing financial fragility and precipitating crises. 
The next chapter shifts the focus from the financial sector to natural 
'tesources - a subject of immense relevance to Africa, given the current 
dependence of so many of the countries in the region on resources. Jourdan1 
-frt'1Towards a Resource-based African Industrialization Policy/1 takes a broad 
"mew of Africa's natural resource endowments, not only the hydrocarbons 
~.and minerals, but also its land and water, which support a wide range of 
dustries, including agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and tourism. He shows 
'!v Africa's unique natural resource base could provide its peoples with 
important lever to achieve industrialization and development objec-
l~S. But this will require moving away from the /{free mining11 mineral 
es inherited from colonialism, and taking advantage of, and develop-
linkages - forward, backward, and horizontal. He shows in detail how 
stria! policies can play a pivotal role in ensuring that the resource rich 
tries move beyond simply a dependence on resources. He warns that 
rrent polices risks leaving Africa with little more than ghost towns, 
th exhausted soils and depleted fisheries, forests and other natural 
men ts. 
sely related and difficult issue is that of land tenure and land reform, 
Deininger takes up in "The Global 'Rush' for Land: Does it Provide 
ities for African Countries? 11 For countries dependent on agricul-
, e recent wave of investor interest in farmland could1 in principle1 
¢t in motion a virtuous cycle for economic growth and poverty 
n. However, historical evidence suggests that these opportunities 
squandered, with negative long-term impacts. Deininger reviews 
rience, quantifies country-level potential for area expansion vs 
·on, and identifies the determinants of countries 1 attractiveness 
rs in the initial stages of the "land rush." Noting that weak land 
e seems to increase, rather than reduce, land demand, he argues 
ving land and natural resource governance and enhancing the 
· ty and acrountability of the process of land sales will be neces-
benefits of these important assets are to be fully realized . 
. Lohi, and Djiofack conclude this section with their chapter on 
lltation and African Industrialization: An Agenda for the Textile 
el Industry." As formal trade barriers have come down, in many 
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instances, the increases in trade have proved disappointing. This has shifted 
attention to other barriers to trade, which include the absence of infra-
structure, supply-side constraints (including the absence of finance),16 and· 
procedures and processes associated with the movement of goods across 
borders. The latter is referred to as trade facilitation. They show that even 
small improvements in trade facilitation could lead to substantial increases 
in exports and enhanced regional integration. Moreover, trade faciiitation 
could offset the negative impacts of tariffs on African trade. 
The last section of the book is devoted to analyses of cross-country expe-
riences and case studies. ln "Industrial Structural Change1 Growth Patterns 
and industrial Policy," Alcorta, Haraguchi, and Rezonja analyze industrial 
change through the examination of the relationship between growth pat-
terns in value added, labor productivity and employment in a sample of 
relatively large countries. A key problem in the implementation of indus-
trial policies noted earlier is the identification of sectors with potential for 
growth that should be receive support. They provide an empirical analysis 
and develop a methodology that may be helpful in doing so. They offer 
empirical evidence that while any industry can expand on the basis of rapid 
increases of labor resources, only those industries that improve productivity 
substantially survive in the long run. A threshold of about US$10,000 GDP 
per capita (2005 US$ PPP adjusted) is observed as a major turning point 
before labor-intensive industries start losing labor cost advantage and begin 
shedding labor. By contrast structural change beyond US$23,000 GDP per 
capita (2005 US$ PPP adjusted) involves the consolidation of industries that 
have continuously pursued technological upgrading, innovation and scale 
and capital intensity advantages. 
Ansu, in "industrial Policy and Economic Transformation in Africa: 
Strategies for Development and a Research Agenda," provides an overview of 
the evolution of economic development policy in Sub-Saharan Africa over the 
forty-year period from 1970 to 2010. He notes that whether the focus is on 
the state-led import-substitution subperiod (1970 to early 1980s) or the sub-
period of Structural Adjustment Programs (mid-1980s to early 2000s), there 
has been very little progress on economic transformation. Drawing from the 
experiences in African and East Asian countries that have been successful in 
transforming their economies, he argues that successful transformations will 
be based on policies that will involve both the state and the private sector 
and proposes a framework to track and assess the emerging industrial policy 
regimes designed to bring about the necessary economic transformation. 
ln "The Premature De-Industrialization of South Africa," lmbs tal<es a cioser 
look at the patterns of structural transformation in a country that represents 
about one-third of Sub-Saharan Africa's gross domestic product. He shows 
the South African economy has not oniy moved away from manufacturing; 
but displayed a sudden increased specialization of sectoral activity in the late 
2000s, at a level of per capita GDP much lower than is customary in comparable 
sis of census data rev1 
ogeneous geographica 
increasingly resembl 
need everywhere. This 
aphically concentrate1 
e South African region 
national trade openne: 
handra studies industri. 
umpstart structural tr< 
or. Ethiopia has the 1 
argues, but its firms f< 
acity-constrained gover 
cy that selectively rem 
ale up production am 
ss some market and 
tor-specific solutions in 
input, output and la 
g-and-play industrial f 
gin managerial capita 
The book ends with two 
nt. ln "Industrializatior 
the island country by w 
Hcies that have undeq 
e middle-of-the-road ap] 
llcies, and the importa1 
.adapt to changing glob: 
,pragmatism is reminis1 
gapore's Industrial Pol 
!icy, which is accompar 
',od institutions1 con·obc 
sented in the conceptu 
ce of learning and kno 
The collection of paper 
out industriai policy. n 
'al policy as not just tin! 
es, but as part of a couff 
'structural transformation 
,€conomies 11 that have bee 
Despite many areas of I 
there are still disagreeme 
this is reflected in the co1 
papers. 
. This has shifted 
1bsence of infra-
)f finance),16 and 
of goods across 








1t in a sample of 
ntation of indus-
vith potential for 
'mpirical analysis 
ng so. They offer 
the basis of rapid 
1rove productivity 
t US$10,000 GDP 
jor turning point 
'antage and begin 
.$23,000 GDP per 
of industries that 
ovation and scale 
nation in Africa: 
les an overview of 
ran Africa over the 
Ler the focus is on 
1980s) or the sub-
'arly 2000s), there 
Drawing from the 
been successful in 
3.nsformations will 
the private sector 
<> industrial policy 
:ansformation. 
hnbs takes a closer 
1try that represents 
iroduct. He shows 
Jill manufacturing, 
activity in the late 
nary in comparable 
f. Stiglitz, J. Lin, C. Monga, and E. Patel 19 
economies. South Africa specialized in services, rather than extractive activi-
ties, whose share in the aggregate economy has trended downwards. The 
analysis of census data reveals that the country's specialization in services is 
homogeneous geographically. Regions that used to produce different goods 
now increasingly resemble each other, because services are increasingly 
produced everywhere. This is especially true of financial services, which were 
geographically concentrated prior to 2000, but subsequently developed across 
all the South African regions. Imbs argues this transition reflects the increasing 
international trade openness of South Africa. 
Chandra studies industrial policy in Ethiopia, where the government wants 
to jumpstart stmctural transformation by fostering a light manufacturing 
sector. Ethiopia has the potential to compete with China and Vietnam, 
She argues, but its films face too many constraints which its resource- and 
capacity-constrained government cannot resolve at once. A targeted industrial 
policy that selectively removes the most critical constraints in each industry 
.to scale up production and exports can help, but government needs to first 
redress some market and policy-induced failures and increase competition. 
Sector-specific solutions include lowering input costs by liberalizing agricul-
Jural input, output and land markets, hnproving trade logistics, developing 
plug-and-play industrial parks, and fostering foreign direct investment to 
bring in managerial capital. 
Tue book ends with two short case studies of successful industrial develop-
ent. In 11 Industrialization: The Mauritian Model," Narrainen tells the story 
'!he island country by weaving together the main elements, decisions, and 
licies that have underpinned economic growth. The model highlights 
e middle-of-the-road approach, sometimes combining a heterodox mix of 
)icies, and the importance of timely shifting industrialization paradigms 
adapt to changing global circumstances. In some ways, that strategy based 
· ragrnatism is reminiscent of the one that Thia describes in "Sharing of 
apore's Industrial Policy Insights." Singapore's experience of industrial 
cy, which is accompanied by a strong educational sector, free trade, and 
d institutions, corroborates many of the elements of the new thinking 
ented in the conceptual chapters of the book - most notably the impor-
e of learning and knowledge. 
e collection of papers in this book reflects the revolution in thinking 
t industrial policy. They present the new understandings that see indus-
1,policy as not just tinkering at the edges of correcting minor market fail-
1 but as part of a country's core strategy for promoting development - for 
al transformation and for creating the kind of "learning societies and 
Omies 11 that have been the hallmark of those countries have succeeded. 
:es:pite many areas of broad consensus on the objectives and principles, 
are still disagreements on the use of some specific economic tools -
Js reflected in the comments by discussants, which follow some of the 
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But we believe that the large corpus of knowledge and experiences pre-
sented here provide a convincing case that the governments of Africa ought 
to make industrial policies an important pillar of their development strategy, 
and that they ought to think carefully about the impact of all their other 
policies - macroeconomic policies like exchange rate management, micro-
economic policies like competition policy - on the structure of their econ-
omy. There is not a single policy that will work in all countries: one of the 
key messages of these chapters is that successful industrial policies have to 
be tailored to the circumstances of the country (including the "quality" of its 
governance and the capacities of both the public and the private sector). We 
believe that this book has shown the wide range of objectives that industrial 
policies in Africa should pursue, and the wide range of instruments by which 
those objectives can be achieved. Hopefully, this will enable the revolution 
in the theory of industrial policies to be translated into a revolution in the 
practice - a change which holds out the promise that the remarkable growth 
experienced in Africa over the past decade will be sustained, and that the 
development strategies will be even more successful in promoting inclusive 
growth, poverty reduction, and broad-based increases in living standards. 
Notes 
1. Mandela (1994: 325). 
2. The case for rethinking and rehabilitating industrial policy in made in Lin and 
Stlglitz (forthcoming), the companion volume to this book. 
3. Mandela, op. cit., idem. 
4. The papers presented here wel'e initially discussed at an International Economic-: 
Association roundtable conference on "New Thinking on Industrial Policy; 
Implications for Africa," held in Pretoria, July 3-4, 2012, and co-sponsored 
by the World Bank, UNIDO, and the South African Economic Development 
Department. 
5. Over the past decade real income per person in Africa has increased by more than 
30 percent, whereas in the previous 20 years it shrank by nearly 10 percent. Ovet 
the next decade its gross domestic product is expected to rise by an average of 6 
percent a year. 
6. See World Bank (1993) and Stiglitz (1996). 
7. For a discussion, see Noman and Stiglitz (2012b). 
8. Note that it may be more important to select s01ne industry on which to focus 
attention than to select the best industry on which to focus. 
9. For further discussions of these issues, see Stiglitz (2013) and Noman and Stiglitz 
(2012a and 2012b). · 
10. World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
11. A back-of-the envelop calculation is as follows: 5 percent GDP growth a year 
with a projected 2.2 percent population growth for the next 25 years (according 
to United Nations projections) equils a GDP per capita of 2.2 percent a year. 
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of 1.5 gives a reduction of poverty of 3.3 percent a year, which applied to the 
current headcount index of 50 percent is about 1.7 points. 
12. The value added of industry as a proportion of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
31.2 percent in 1970, increased to 37.B percent in 19BO, and is 30.4 percent today, 
after a 199B low of 2B.4 percent (World Bank World Development Indicators 
database). 
13. GDP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa increased fairly steadily from $416 in 1960 
to $577 in 1977. At that point, it began an uneven decline (some intervening 
years marked increases) to $4B2 in 1994. It regained its 1977 level in 2006, and is 
now $640. (World Bank World Development Indicators database). 
14. Chang (200B) reminds us that, not so long ago, it was not unusual to refer to 
, "Lazy Japanese and Thieving Germans." People do differ in their tastes, norms, 
cultures, and behaviors (Basu, 2011). But social norms and customs are not hard-
wired into genetic structure. There <ire fascinating studies which show how Japan, 
as recently as hundred years ago, was a very unpunctual society. There are studies 
showing that Koreans
1 
barely, fifty or sixty years ago, lacked industry and drive. 
Glven that Japan is today one of the world's most punctual countries and Koreans 
one of the most industrious people, this shows that no1ms which look ingrained 
are actually malleable. There is need for research to understand how good norms 
are formed and dysfunctional norms can be rooted out. 
See Lln (2012). 
These impediments to trade have given rise to the Aid for Trade movement. For 
a broader discussion of these issues, see Charlton and Stiglitz (20061 200B, 2013). 
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